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BOOK REVIEW
Electricity and the Environment: The Reform of Legal Institutions.
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL

COMMITTEE ON ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

St. Paul:

West Publishing Company. 1972. Pp. xv, 332. $9.00.
Most people do not know what happens technologically when they
flip on a light switch. However, the public is becoming increasingly
aware of its dependency on energy resources. Perhaps this consciousness began with the famous Northeast Blackout in the Fall of 1965. Or
perhaps the growth of an environmental awareness, focusing in part
on energy production and utilization, has played a role. For whatever
reason, the "energy crisis" has already become a common cliche.
Initially energy questions were debated only by the energy industry and government bureaucrats.' When environmental groups became
organized, they responded within this framework, but subsequently attempted to reshape the contours of the debate. The utility companies
have begun to address environmental issues. 2 Recently, the Ford Foundation established the Energy Policy Project in order to extend investigations more explicitly into policy questions.3
Government has responded to this public awareness. The National
Science Foundation has funded major studies at Cornell University,
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Rand Corporation.4
Legislative innovations have occurred on both the federal3 and state6
levels. The President's Office of Science and Technology produced
key studies in this area under Presidents Johnson7 and Nixon.8 In
1971, the City of New York published a major report on the issues of
energy and the environment.9 The Interior Department has kept a
1 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 6112 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
2 See, e.g., FlE.ETRICUTILITY TASK FORCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1968).

3 See ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, THE ENERGY POLICY REPORT No. 1 (1972).
4 See CORNELL UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE CORNELL WORKSHOP ON ENERGY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1972).

5 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
6 See, e.g., chs. 385, 386, [1 9 72] N.Y. Laws 1635-52.
7 PRESIDENT's OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING STEA &
POWER PLANTS SIrE SELECTION (1969).
8 PRESIDENT'S OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVIRON-

MENT (1970).
9 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY OF NEv YORK, TOWARD
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watchful eye throughout,

°

as have, of course, the Atomic Energy Com-

mission and the Federal Power Commission. The Joint Economic Committee of the Congress has also commissioned studies in the area." This
is just a sample of recent activities. It should not be surprising then
that the trendiest bar association in the country, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, has undertaken an intensive study of the
topic as well.
The bar association's interest in the problems of electric generation
and the environment was prompted in large part by a controversy on
the subject involving the New York State Legislature and Governor
Rockefeller from 1970 to 1972.12 The association formed a special committee from the membership of five of its regular committees: administrative law, atomic energy, environmental law, science and law, and
post-admission legal education. The committee of eleven and staff of
ten worked for almost a year to produce its report. Appended to the
report are the individual views of six members and the dissenting statements of two.
Although it focuses predominantly upon electrical energy, with
only minor coverage of other energy forms, within its chosen topic this
report is noteworthy for the breadth of its coverage. Of special interest
is the discussion of the demand for electrical power. At the outset of
the public debate on electricity and the environment, increasing demand was always taken as a given, reflecting the utilities' point of view.
Based on projections from the recent past, the statement was frequently
made that our need for electrical power doubles every ten years. Recently, however, strong voices have been urging that demand be recognized as a social variable. 13
Acknowledging that the issue of demand is a political matter, the
committee concluded that "[o]nly Congress has the capability and standing to decide such profound questions, questions which should be
examined consciously, deliberately and soon."' 4 Although the jurisdictional fragmentation of congressional committees makes such federal
legislative action improbable, the real issue, in any case, is the nature
A RATIONAL PowER POLICY: RECONCILING NEEDs FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL

PRO-

TECTION (1971).
10 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. ENERGY: A SUMMARY

REvIE

(1972).

11 See U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. Commi., THE ECONOMY, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONmENT (1970).

12 This dispute culminated in the enactment of legislation. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
13 Perhaps the first official government report advocating this viewpoint was the New
York City study. See note 9 supra.
14 P. 5.
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of the interests and values that Congress might consider as inputs to
its decision-making process.
A full chapter of the report is devoted to a discussion of the demand for electricity and energy.'15 It relates electricity usage to overall
energy production and growth (as indicated by GNP). The concept of
"efficiency" is used (indicating the influence of some economists, no
doubt) to explain "external costs."'1 6 The text employs the term in a
more usual way also, noting that some work has recently been initiated
to improve the efficiency of electrical usage by means of better insulation, equipment design, and the like. The discussion in this chapter is,
however, also oriented to the economists' point of view in that efficiency
7
of usage is seen as tied to price elasticity.'
Obviously, price is an important factor in the supply-demand situation. In theory, electrical rates are set by means of "consumption
blocks" which resemble quantity discounts for high use. In other
words, the per unit cost of electrical energy is billed at a lower rate as
total customer usage increases. In practice, most regulatory commissions focus primary attention on the utilities' rate of return rather
than on their rate structure. However, environmentalists and others
have begun to question the classification and structuring of electrical
8
utility rates, and the report contains a good discussion of this issue.'
One aspect of demand which the report does not explore fully is
the relationship between electric power availability and socioeconomic
class. Environmentalists should be sensitive to the fact that if pollution
abatement measures increase the cost of the product, then the poor
will be less able to purchase electricity. While a small increase in the
price of electricity may be an annoyance to the middle class, it can be
a burdensome expense to those of low income. It has been estimated
that a national average for air and thermal pollution control costs in
1976 will be about seven percent of 1970 company revenues. 19 The only
discussion in the report which deals with distributional economic effects
15 Ch.VI.
16 External costs are the costs to society of producing an item which are neither
borne by the manufacturing company nor reflected in the price of the product. Air and
water pollution are good examples of such external effects of the generation of electric
power.
17 Price elasticity of demand is a concept which relates the degree of responsiveness
of the quantity of an item being marketed to its market price. For example, an elastic
demand is one in which a given percentage price decrease increases demand by a larger
percentage.

18 Pp. 179-85.
19 COUNCIL ON
DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

ENVIRONMENTAL

THE

QUALITY,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL

26-27 (1972).

US.
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concerns an analysis of a hypothetical energy tax.2 0 Other aspects of the
demand factor, such as the effect of changing life styles, are not ex2
plored by the report. '
After providing a background by discussing the demand for energy,
electricity and the economy, and the physical-chemical aspects of electricity and the environment, the report devotes four major chapters to
the process by which decisions on electric power generation are reached.
In addition to demand, the committee finds six major inputs into that
process: capacity and its regional allocation; land use considerations;
alternatives for producing electrical power; research and development;
air and water quality standards; and safety standards. These issues are
discussed in terms of the private sector's role, the public sector's role,
the regulatory structure, gaps in the decision-making process, and current legislative reform approaches. Recommendations responsive to each
of these seven issues, as well as to other considerations, are presented.
The overview discussion of the decision-making process for electric
power generation 22 presents a valuable primer on the above issues as
of early May 1972. There is a good review of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and some basic materials on the Administrative Procedure Act. 23 The material on air and water standards is,
however, inevitably flawed by predating the far-reaching Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.24 Although state and local
regulation is covered, indicating the large range of possible agencies
and their potential requirements at different governmental levels, the
major focus of the chapter is on federal regulatory activity. In this context, the workings of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal
Power Commission are explored. The role that the Army Corps of
Engineers plays in the process in issuing permits regarding navigable
waters is also discussed.
The report's critique of the decision-making process 25 is among
the most interesting chapters of the book. Primarily this is because the
materials covered are not frequently found in print, and even when
they are, they are usually not presented with this degree of directness
and candor. It is immensely beneficial to have such flaws publicly
examined by a prestigious and presumably neutral body like the New
20 Pp. 173-76.
21 For a discussion of changing life styles as a demand factor see Corr & MacLeod,
Getting It Together, 14 ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1972, at 2.
22 Ch. IV.
23 Pp. 56-61.
24 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
25 Ch. V.
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York City bar association. Usually such criticisms are produced by
partisan advocates within the context of regulatory procedures or litigation; unfortunately, many people do not readily believe claims made
under such circumstances, especially when the parties advancing them
are "outsiders."
The report presents these criticisms of the decision-making process:
1. Gaps in the Process. "[M]any of the most important issues receive no explicit attention. Instead, they are resolved only as an unconscious by-product of other actions because government is not structured to treat energy as a discrete area of decision-making." 2 These
gaps include the important issues of the growth in demand for electricity and alternative modes of generating electric power. Despite the
report's conclusion that such gaps are not quite filled by NEPA, it is
possible to read case law so as to suggest that agencies must affirmatively
discharge such obligations. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Morton 27 the court held that NEPA required an agency to consider
all feasible alternative courses of action to deal with a particular problem, including those options which lay outside the statutory jurisdiction of the agency. One of the functions of the decision-making procedure embodied in the environmental impact statement requirement
of the Act 28 is to alert the President, Congress, and the public to realworld issues, unhampered by jurisdictional happenstance. An earlier
case not involving NEPA, Udall v. FPC,29 indicates that the option of
not constructing a facility, the "no-action" or delay possibility, should
be included among the array of alternatives considered by an agency.
Finally, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,30 not to mention the subsequent language of NEPA itself, stresses the affirmative
role an agency must discharge in protecting the public interest, not-

ing that the law "does not permit it [the agency] to act as an umpire
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it
"31

Other gaps include research and development (electric utilities
being notorious for devoting a small percentage of revenues to these
activities)8 2 and "geographical externalities" (for example, nonexistence
26
27
28
29
30
31

P. 106.
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
387 U.S. 428 (1967).
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 620.
32 See 119 CONG. Rac. E 428-29 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1973) (remarks of Senator Metcalf).
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of any mechanism at the federal level for regionally allocating electric
generating sites).
2. Lack of Rule Making. Virtually all agencies in the field possess
both procedural and substantive rule-making power. Nonetheless, one
of the special committee's most important conclusions is that too many
problems and issues are still handled by means of ad hoc licensing procedures instead of by a generic approach. This situation is obviously
inefficient and possibly is inequitable as well. Moreover, it is a bar to
rational and comprehensive planning. Yet the lack of standardized
components for equipment used in generating facilities, and the lack
of specificity in legislative standards like "the public interest," tend
to make the adoption of generic proceedings more difficult.
3. Multiple Licensing. The potential for conflict between governmental levels in a federal system and the resulting limited and fragmented jurisdictional lines, leads to duplication of effort, delay, and
increased costs.
4. Delay. Delay is linked to questions of electrical system reliability and the capacity to engage in adequate planning. The average time
needed to get a permit from regulatory agencies appears to be increasing. Delay, of course, is caused by factors other than environmental
concerns. Indeed, such matters as labor strikes and poor quality control
in meeting equipment specifications are usually more substantial.
5. The Disclosure of Information. The need for adequate, timely,
and full disclosure of information about activities having a large scale
social impact should be self evident. This factor is intimately linked
to the next criticism.
6. Public Participation.The report is exemplary in its strong
endorsement of the virtues of public participation. It draws on a wealth
of materials by courts and prestigious commentators to the effect that
intervention by members of the public and citizens' groups can help
government agencies be responsive to public issues and a variety of
interests. The fundamental problem is to assure that interests which
are diffuse, without adequate resources, fragmented, and not initially
well informed, are adequately taken into account in public decisionmaking. 33 There are numerous obstacles to effective public participation, not the least of which is the prevalent attitude of government
agencies that public interest intervenors are intermeddlers or "outside
agitators." Yet the special committee goes so far as to suggest that gov33 STAF OF HOUSE CO1m. ON SCIENCE & ASTRONAUICS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., TECHNOLOGY: PROCEmSSE
OF AssEsSMENT AND CHOICE (Comm. Print 1969).
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ernment support of intervention is essential, not only in the adjudicatory modes of decision-making, but also in a longer-term and more
sustained manner for the earlier phases of the planning process.
7. Agency Credibility. The Atomic Energy Commission's history
of inaction on environmental questions, so effectively chastised by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the Calvert Cliffs
case, 34 is merely the most obvious example of widespread attitudes and
concomitant performance records on the part of contemporary agencies.
The distrust which has been engendered is not difficult to understand.
Clearly, any effective overhaul of decision-making processes must deal
with this criticism. Unfortunately, even the Atomic Energy Commission, as evidenced by its recent handling of nuclear safety issues, may
not have learned the lesson of Calvert Cliffs.
One full chapter of the report is devoted to legislative reform
proposals which were current in early 1972.35 These include bills pending in Congress pertaining to the siting of electric facilities, land use
planning, and research and development. Also covered are legislative
efforts in a number of the states. Since this topic is in constant evolution, the chapter is useful primarily as a survey up to a given point
in time. It may be valuable for understanding proposals put forward
at a later date, but even in the intervening year the nature of some of
the issues and the proffered ways of dealing with them have changed.
We are finally led to the recommendations.8 6 After reviewing the
flaws in the present procedure for regulating electricity and the environment, the special committee recommends and attempts to justify
the creation of an "Energy Commission," a federal regulatory body
which would consolidate current regulatory activity, and an "Energy
Agency" which would be designed to handle research and development
activities. The federal Energy Commission should investigate the question of demand for energy and present its studies and recommendations
to the Congress. Federal legislation should require the states to establish siting commissions which would work with the Federal Energy
Commission to handle issues such as allocation and regional reliability.
But the states would retain the responsibility for providing the exact
sites for generating facilities, except for those having national or major
regional significance, such as offshore nuclear plants, large installations,
and hydroelectric plants on navigable streams. The wider utilization
of generic procedures and standards is urged. Public participation
34 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

Ch. VII.
36 Ch. vIIi.
35
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should be facilitated through the provision of adequate and timely information, reforms which would open up agency operating procedures,
and subsidization programs which include awarding costs and fees to
public groups.
The inclusion of the individual views and dissenting statements
of some committee members, in the manner of judicial concurrences
and dissents, serves to highlight some important issues. For example,
committee members Sive and Butzel believe it is necessary that
courts be given the freedom to deal with essential value judgments
in the context of changing times and in a manner which does not
restrict them to merely procedural matters. The courts, in short,
should have the authority to cross the substantive threshold where
the balancing of competing values, rather than technical expertise,
is the real issue. 37
Committee members Kennedy, Lowenstein, and Murphy would have
preferred less emphasis on federal activity. They suggest that regulatory organization at the state level should be further analyzed and that
utility company initiative should be preserved wherever possible. The
relationship between the report recommendations and NEPA, as interpreted by Calvert Cliffs' also troubles them.38 Members Carlson and
Henry, who dissent separately, urge continued protection for the role
of the private sector.
In spite of the overall excellence of this report, it is possible to
fault it on one fundamental point. Nowhere does the special committee
seriously discuss the alternative of nationalization as a means for handling the problems of energy exploitation (or, more specifically, electrical power generation) in the context of increasing environmental
concern. In spite of the well-known American pragmatism which might
indicate the futility of such a discussion, it is true that most other
countries understand the provision of electrical energy to be a proper
governmental function. Even in America, there are consumer-owned
and municipality-owned generating and transmission systems. It is a
disappointment that a report which in other ways is so complete and
well done, overlooks the exploration of such a basic option.
Philip L. Bereano*
37 P. 318. See also Portnoy, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55
CoauLa L. REV. 861 (1970).
88 P. 313.
* Assistant Professor of Environmental Engineering, Cornell University. B.Ch.E. 1962,
Cornell University; J.D. 1965, Columbia University; M.R.P. 1971, Cornell University.

